The Hilltop Review
Volume 3
Issue 1 Fall

Article 5

October 2009

Are Institutions the Answer? Mitigating Sectarian Protest in
Divided Nations
Matthew P. Arsenault
Western Michigan University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/hilltopreview
Part of the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
Arsenault, Matthew P. (2009) "Are Institutions the Answer? Mitigating Sectarian Protest in Divided
Nations," The Hilltop Review: Vol. 3 : Iss. 1 , Article 5.
Available at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/hilltopreview/vol3/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Graduate College at ScholarWorks at WMU. It has
been accepted for inclusion in The Hilltop Review by an
authorized editor of ScholarWorks at WMU. For more
information, please contact wmuscholarworks@wmich.edu.

40

ARE INSTI TUTIONS THE ANSWER? MI TIGATI NG
SECTARIAN PROTEST IN DIVIDED NATIONS
By Matthew P. Arsenault
Department o f Political Science
College of Arts and Sciences

Abstract. Ethnic violence has increased expon entially in the decad es following World War II. As such, it is imperative that cures fo r the unique ills
found in divided societies be discovered. This article seeks to quantitatively
investigate the effici ency o f fo rmal political institutions in curbing ethnically-bas ed violent protest in divided societies. As such, the dependent variable is the level of violent protest, while the independent variables include: a
parliamentary system o f governm ent, a proportional rep res entation electo ral
system, and a federated system. It is my contention that such institutions will
significantly lessen incidents of ethnically-motivated violent protest. In addition, this article concludes with suggestions for fu rther research in examining institutional structures and ethnic con flict.

The third wave of democratization has ushered in a global movement toward democracy and the creation of newly independent states. However, the transitions to
democracy have not always been peaceful. For all its excitement and reported benefits, this wave of democratization has coincided with an increase in ethnic conflict,
particularly in the developing world (Gurr 1993). In order to quell the increase in
sectarian violence it is necessary to explore which political institutions moderate violent protest in multi-ethnic societies. By moderating violent protest, it is hoped that
more wide-ranging ethnic violence will be prevented.
In all societies, institutions serve as structures which govern human interactions
and behavior. Douglass North defines institutions as “the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, [institutions as] the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” (2004: 3). There are few societies that are more in need of strong
institutional structures to ensure stability than those with numerous conflicting ethnic
groups. Only through the implementation of specifically designed political institutional structures can a state limit violence between ethnicities.
T wo paradigms stand at the fore of institutional design in multi-ethnic societies:
the consociational and majoritarian models of democracy. The consociational model
contends that, in divided societies, a system of consensus between actors is paramount in the policy-making process. The institutions created in a consociational democracy recognize ethnic divisions as autonomous entities and make those cleavages
“the basis for rule in decision making, territorial division of power, and public policies” (Caspersen 2004: 570). Some political institutions found in the consociational
model include a power-sharing government, a proportional representation system, and
some degree of federalism.
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On the other side of the spectrum, the majoritarian model is closely linked with the
Anglo-American, or Westminster model, of democracy. The majoritarian model
represents a system in which political competition is based upon “electorally competitive elites organized into a governing party and a loyal opposition with the major parties alternating over time” (Sterling 1978: 303). Unlike consociationalism, the majoritarian paradigm argues that political elites will not always agree to cooperate. As
such, majoritarianism contends that institutions need to be created to ensure moderation and multi-ethnicity among factions (Horowitz 2004). Political institutions found
commonly in a majoritarian model include a unitary government, single-member district electoral systems, and alternating opposition rule over time.
Exploring the effectiveness of institutional structures in divided societies provides
democracy scholars with a theoretical basis with which to explore possible solutions
to the problems faced by emerging democracies.
Although proven successful in many cases, predominantly in the developed world,
majoritarian systems in deeply divided and developing societies may lead to ethnic or
cultural conflict (Daalder 1974). By studying varying institutional solutions to sectarian problems, the democracy theorist is better able to prescribe remedies to real-world
conflicts and make the new wave of democratization more stable and equitable.
T wo claims emerge from the consociational and majoritarian democracy paradigms. First, the consociational institutions of power-sharing government, minority
veto, proportional electoral system, and ethnic autonomy lead to lower levels of violent ethnic protest in pluralistic societies. By creating a system in which ethnic
groups have access to the political process, violence becomes a less acceptable solution to ethnic troubles. Second, majoritarian institutions, which demand a crosscutting of ethnic cleavages, lead to multi-ethnic moderation and encourage cooperation in divided societies, thus lessening levels of violent ethnic protest. Of these two
claims, I argue that the consociational paradigm serves as better model for conflict
moderation in divided societies and limits incidents of violent ethnic protest.
The literature addressing political institutions in multi-cultural societies is vast but
can be traced to Arend Lijphart’s The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands (1968). Here Lijphart begins to structure his model of
consociational democracy by studying the institutions that serve to maintain political
stability in an ethnically divided Netherlands. Lijphart builds upon “ a familiar proposition in pluralist theory: that social cleavages are moderated if different cleavages cut
across one another, but become loaded with conflict if they cumulatively reinforce
one another” (Daalder 1974: 606). Lijphart argues that cooperation between the
cleavage group elites can effectively serve as horizontal bridges between factions,
thus decreasing the potential for violent conflict.
Lijphart argued that a number of criteria must be met for consociational democracy to be successful. First, distinct lines of cleavage must exist. Rather than attempting to erase deeply seated ethnic division, consociational theorists see the divisions as an ingrained aspect of societies and must be addressed as such. Second, the
masses must favor a grand coalition maintaining a balance of power between factions.
It is here that Lijphart begins to frame his ideas on the importance of elite cooperation.
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Lijphart writes:
[a] key requirem ent is that the leaders of the sel f-cont ained blocks must be
particularly convin ced o f the desirability of pres erving the system. And they
must be willing and capable of bridging the gaps between the mutually isolated blocs and resolving serious disputes in a largely nonconsensual con text. (1968: 103-4).

Lastly, a moderate degree of nationalism must exist to encourage cooperation between factions, with a limited amount of stress on the system as a whole (Hudson
1976). A sense of nationalism is necessary to decrease the reliance on ethnic identity
and depoliticize ethnicity, which, in turn, makes groups more tolerant of differing
groups and lends stability and legitimacy to the state government. With a more unifying identity, fewer incidents of violent protest are apt to occur.
Eric Nordlinger’s Conflict Regulation in Deeply Divided Societies (1972) builds
on Lijphart’s description of the consociational paradigm and provides a systematic
approach to conflict resolution. Nordlinger establishes six practices used to control
conflict between cleavage groups that would subse quently decrease incidents of violent protest in divided societies: the establishment of a stable coalition government,
proportional electoral systems, a sense of depoliticization, minority veto, a compromise between groups, and concessions between stronger cleavage groups toward the
weaker (Hudson 1976; Lijphart 1977). These institutions may grant ethnic groups a
greater and more efficient say in the political process which, in turn, would make violent protest an unattractive alternative.
During the late seventies, a number of important review articles appeared that
called for “ greater attention to be paid to interethnic bargaining, compromise, balancing, reciprocity and cooperation as techniques for maintaining the stability and integrity of plural societies” in the developing world (Lustic 1979: 329). In Democracy in
Plural Societies, Lijphart steps away from continental Europe and addresses the problems of consociational systems in the developing world. Influenced by Sir Arthur
Lewis’ study of thirteen African states, Lijphart argues that majoritarian or competitive systems, if enacted in the developing world, potentially will lead to authoritarian
regimes which, in turn, may promote ethnic patronage and paternalistic government
(1977: 144). Reiterating the point, Robert Dahl writes, “obviously any system is in
peril if it becomes polarized into several highly antagonistic groups. Confronted by
severe polarization, competitive regimes are prone to collapse, to a coup d’etat, (or)
to civil war” (1971: 105).
Dahl, Lewis, and Lijphart do not argue that democracy is a poor fit in divided
states but, rather, that the majoritarian model of democracy fits poorly. Lijphart
quotes Lewis at length and the passage will add clarity here:
Britain and France are class societies, and thei r institutions and conventions
are designed to cope with this fact. West Africa is not a class society; its
problem is that it is a plural society. What is good for a class society is bad
fo r a plural society. Hence to create good political institutions in West Africa one h as to think of thei r problem through the found ations up. (1977:
145).
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Consociation theorists build upon the idea of elite cooperation. According to the
consociational model, ethnic group elites understand the dangers posed if ethnic conflict continues. As such, it is hoped that the various sectarian leaders will choose to
cooperate and adhere to institutional structures that recognize ethnic divisions and
promote stability. In turn, under a system which encourages elite cooperation, political elites are less likely to encourage members of their ethnic groups to participate in
violent protest.
It becomes rational for the leadership of ethnic groups to enter such institutions, as
the long-term benefits outweigh the short-term gains brought through competition. As
such, the institutions, once in place, will encourage an environment in which violent
protest is viewed as costly and negative.
In reviewing the consociational theoretical literature, Hans Daalder provides a succinct description of the consociational model’s emphasis on elite cooperation. Daalder writes, “ strongly divided societies can be stabilized by a conscious effort on the
part of political elites, provided they deliberately seek to counteract the immobilizing
and destabilizing effects of cultural fragmentation” (1974: 607). Indeed, a major
catalyst for cultural fragmentation is unmitigated violent political protest. In order for
elite cooperation to be successful, elites must forgo the competition espoused by the
Anglo-American model of democracy and instead form a union of ethnic elites. For
this leadership union to be successful, “ they [the elites] must rely instead on forms of
proportional representation in which no single actor acquires a mandate” (1974: 607).
In addition to a proportional representation system, the governing regime must
grant a level of autonomy to the ethnic groups composing the union. By granting freedoms to the cleavage groups, and imposing the will of the greater union only when
doing so is in the best interest of all parties concerned, ethnic conflict and political
struggle can be kept to a minimum. In discussing the role of federalism as autonomy,
Fukuyama writes, “ in politics, federalism (as a form of autonomy) means that government is closer and more visible to the people it is meant to serve, which theoretically
should increase accountability and therefore legitimacy and quality of democracy” (2004: 70). As the quality and legitimacy of the political system increases, the
levels of disenchantment with the system will fall, thus lessening incidents of violent
ethnic protest. Aside from federalism, institutions such as mutual veto and unanimity
serve to ensure the autonomy necessary to promote a decline in violent ethnic protest.
Nevertheless, many opponents of the consociational model claim that little chance
of consensus exists in a deeply divided society. Barry Weingast offers three reasons
why “ universalistic limits on government, applying to members of all ethnic groups
are difficult to sustain” (1997: 256). First, the values of the different cleavage groups
are often at odds, making accommodation difficult. Second, one group may benefit
from exploiting another. As such, a collective action problem ensues. Lastly, even if
all conflicting groups desire an end to conflict, the actual establishment of a solution
palatable to all parties is difficult at best (1997: 256-7).
Horowitz’ integrative mode addresses stability in multi-cultural societies and mitigates many of Weingast’s concerns. A derivative of the Anglo-American democratic
model, integrativism proposes the adoption of institutions that promote competition
and majority rule in the hopes of overcoming the deep conflicts that are present in
cleavage societies.
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Unlike the consociational model, which adheres to the belief that ethnic elites see
accommodation as a way to maximize their personal interests and the interests of their
particular ethnic group, integrativism views accommodation as complex at best.
Horowitz writes:
Policy makers are participants in their societies. As such, they may entertain
hostile feelings toward members o f other groups. If not, they may still have
a view o f intergroup relations that sees ethnic con flict as necessary to advancem ent of the interests of their group. Even if political leaders do not
hold such views, they may nonetheless benefit, politically or materially,
from continuation of the con flict and be loath to pursue policies of amelioration. (2004: 564).

The integrative model contends that, in order to overcome the self-interested motivations of political elites, a preferential electoral system needs to be created “ in which
a candidate’s election depends on attracting votes from outside his or her ethnic
group” (Caspersen 2004: 571). As such, the integrative approach puts a great value
on elections, while the consociational model places more emphasis on the less public
negotiations between ethnic group elites.
Aside from Horowitz’s critique of the ability of ethnic elites to cooperate, he argues that the consociational model, although effective in small European nations, has
little practicality in the developing world. Horowitz writes:
There are supra-segmental sentiments that tie group members to the Swiss
or the Dutch nation in a way that group members are not tied to an inclusive
conception o f the Lebanese, Malaysian, or Ugandan nation. The European
con flicts are thus less ascriptive in ch aracter, less severe in intensity, less
exclusive in their command of the loyalty of participants, and less preemptive of other forms o f con flict. (2004: 572).

As the integrative and consociational paradigms serve as templates not only for
conflict resolution but establishing governance structures in real-world multi-ethnic
societies, it is imperative to test both models in order to discover the relative effectiveness of these prescribed institutions.
In this study, I argue that the consociational paradigm serves as superior model for
limiting the frequency of violent ethnic protest. I analyze the relationship between
consociational institutions and sectarian protest. I hypothesize that nations governed
by consociational institutions are likely to experience fewer incidents of violent ethnic
protest than their majoritarian counterparts.
The data for this project are drawn from the Minorities at Risk Project. The study
encompasses 233 politically active communal groups in 93 countries each organized
by a host of variables and categories. Unfortunately, the Minorities at Risk Project
does not test the role of particular political institutions on levels of ethnic violence.
However, expanding upon Gurr’s project, Saideman et al. attempt a large-N, pooledtime series analysis for the years 1985 through 1998, seeking to examine the impacts
of political institutions on levels of ethnic conflict.
Saideman et al. draw their dependent variables from Gurr’s project but have creThe Hilltop Review,
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ated their own explanatory variables. One dependent variable was drawn from the
Saideman piece, levels of violent protest, and draws the explanatory variables, electoral system, federalism, and presidential versus parliamentary regime, adapted from
the Minorities at Risk Project.
As the level of analysis of the Saideman project is that of individual ethnic groups
and the level of analysis for this study is the state, the relevant data from the Saideman dataset were aggregated to the national level. In aggregating the dataset, I have
collapsed the Saideman dataset to average the levels of violent protest of all ethnic
groups in a particular nation. In doing so, the data now will represent a total level of
ethnic violence in a particular state rather than levels illustrated by particular groups.
By aggregating the dependent variable, we are better able to make assumptions regarding the levels of violent protest in nations at large. T able 3 illustrates the coding
for the dependent variable.
Three specific political institutions will be used to represent the consociational
paradigm and subsequently serve as the independent variables: a proportional representation electoral system, federalism, and a parliamentary legislative system. Each
is binary so as to allow a clear differentiation between impact of consociational and
majoritarian institutions on levels of violent ethnic protest.

Table 3: Coding for Dependent Variable Violent Protest
Violent Protest
None Reported
Political Banditry, Sporadic Terrorism
Campaigns of Terrorism
Local Rebellions
Small-scale Guerilla Activity
Intermediat e Guerilla Activity
Large-scal e Guerrilla Activity
Protracted Civil War
No Basis for Judgment

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
99

Source: Saideman et al., 2002.

First, I test the levels of violent protest as a function of the electoral system. A
proportional representation system alleviates the polarizing outcomes of a majoritarian system, thus allowing greater participation among marginalized groups. With
greater access to political power, groups are less likely to resort to violent protest in
order to voice their grievances. In addition, a proportional representation system is
conducive to a power-sharing government. Saideman et al. write:
We propose that plurality systems increase group insecurity, because political chang e can be quite dramatic, and exclusion o ften results. If groups can not block objectionable policies, then they may have to engage in either protest or violence to have in fluen ce. In a PR system, on the other hand, coalitions can change, but ethnic groups may gain representation and could play
a significant role either as a co alition partner or in opposition to the government. (111).
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I hypothesize that states with a proportional electoral system will experience fewer
incidents of violent ethnic protest than those without a PR electoral system. As such,
I expect a negative coefficient will exist between the independent variable and the
electoral systems.
I also examine the levels of violent ethnic protest as a function of federalism. The
consociational model argues that a degree of ethnic autonomy is useful in promoting
stability and moderating ethnic grievances. Federalism can be used to ensure a certain level of autonomy. Lijphart writes, “[T he federal] approach is not to abolish or
weaken segmental cleavages but to recognize them explicitly and to turn the segments
into constructive elements of stable democracy” (1977: 42). As such, federalism can
be conducive to the creation of a power-sharing government, one in which all groups
are able to participate in the political process.
Aside from access to the political process, federalism decentralizes the state,
bringing the state closer to those it is created to represent. In doing so, the state gains
legitimacy (Fukuyama 2004). With an increase in legitimacy, groups are less likely
to pursue violent ways to voice their grievances. Relying on Saideman et al., I created
a binary variable to represent federalist structures in a given state.
I hypothesize that a system with federal aspects will have fewer examples of violent ethnic protest. If ethnic groups are granted rights over their own lives, the costs
of violent protest will be great compared to the costs of violent protest in a nonfederated system. As such, I expect a negative relationship between the federal variable and the dependent variables.
The final independent variable examines the role of parliamentary and presidential
political systems on levels of violent ethnic protest. Saideman et al. argue that presidential systems are more effective in promoting stability and limiting conflict. They
contend that “ ethnic groups are more insecure, and thus more likely to engage in violence and preemption, when they cannot block policies that might hurt them. The
division of powers between president and legislature allows each to serve as a check
on the other, even when the same party dominates both branches” (110).
I take issue with this hypothesis, arguing instead that a parliamentary system preempts levels of protest by granting greater political participation and representation to
ethnic groups. In addition, the coalitional nature of a parliamentary system is conducive to a power-sharing government which will, in turn, limit ethnic strife and violent
ethnically- motivated protest. I expect to discover a negative coefficient between the
parliamentary/presidential variable and the dependent variables.
In order to test the relationship between consociational institutions and levels of
ethnic protest, I subjected the model to a Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV)
regression. This estimator was used to address the unique aspects of panel data and
this model in particular. The LSDV regression was used with robust standard errors
to address issues of heteroskedasticity. The results of the regression examine the impact of consociational institutions on levels of nonviolent protest. Table 8 illustrates
the results.
Substantively, the table is quite revealing. Both variables representing federalism
and proportional representation lack statistical significance. The lack of significance
for these variables implies that real-world assumptions cannot be made based upon
the relationships of these variables and levels of violent protest. However, parliamenThe Hilltop Review,
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tarianism plays a significant role in levels of violent protest. The data show that a
state with a parliamentary system is apt to score .332 points higher on the scale of
violent protest than its majoritarian counterparts. As such, these data suggest that a
state with a parliamentary system is likely to have more frequent occurrences of violent ethnic protest that its presidential counterparts. This finding supports the Saideman hypothesis that presidential systems are more apt to promote stability and mitigate ethnic conflict.

Table 8: Violent Ethnic Protest as a Function of Federal, Parliamentary,
and Proportional S ystems
LSDV Regression

Violent Protest

Federal

0.108
(0.116)

Parliamentary

0.332**
(0.142)**

PR System

-0.366
0.340

CONS

-1.28
1.54

Notes:
**Designates p > 0.05;
Standard Error in Parentheses;
N = 962;
Estimates Obtained by STATA 9.0.

Although the parliamentary variable proved significant, the fact that other variables did not leads to a curious puzzle. Do political systems matter in curbing ethnic
violence? What other variables may mitigate sectarian conflict? In short, this article
has illustrated that the design of macro-political institutions is not the sole, and perhaps not the best, approach to curbing ethnic violence. Other avenues of research
must be pursued. One promising path lies in analyzing the impact of informal institutions on ethnic conflict mitigation. This could be done through an examination of the
civil society structures in divided societies, and particularly the impact of nongovernmental organizations in developing the infrastructure to implement crosscutting cleavages. Perhaps the best approach to better understanding ethnic conflict is
by moving from a macro- to a micro-level of analysis. Researchers can conduct costbenefit analyses of various ethnic conflict prevention projects across nations. Through
a more “thick” analysis of the true happenings on the ground, best-practice approaches can be studied, evaluated, and disseminated to those operating within divided states, and a more efficient system can be adopted.
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